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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is brought pursuant to the provisions of
Article VIII, Sections 3 and 5 of the Utah Constitution and
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

Mr. Conger appeals from the Third Judicial District

Court's entry of Summary Judgment in favor of Tel-Tech and from
that Court's Order denying Mr. Conger's Motion to Amend and/or
for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Rules 59(a)(7) and
60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

- V I 1-

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Do genuine issues of material fact exist with respect

to the question of whether Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger a duty?1
II.

Did the District Court correctly rule that Tel-Tech

did not owe Mr. Conger a duty.2
III. Assuming that the District Court erred in holding that
no duty existed, was it harmless error.3

*Mr. Conger's statement of the first issue presumes the
existence of genuine issues of material fact on the question of
whether Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger a duty and then asks whether
the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in the
face of those factual issues. A much fairer and more
applicable statement of the issue would ask whether any factual
disputes exist which, when viewed in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff, (1) must be resolved before the District Court
can correctly assess the existence of a duty, or (2) show that
a duty in fact existed.
2

See Id.

3

Mr. Conger states the second issue in such a way that it
presumes the existence of a duty and then asks whether the
District Court correctly ruled that the duty was not breached.
In fact, the District Court never reached the question of
whether such a duty had been breached because it held that no
such duty existed. Thus, the issue of whether Tel-Tech
breached a duty has yet to be placed squarely before the
court. Tel-Tech contends, however, that if the District Court
incorrectly ruled that Tel-Tech did not owe Mr. Conger a duty,
that error was harmless based on the record.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

On January 1, 1981, Mr. Conger fell from the top of a
stainless steel milk tanker on which he had been walking.

On

September 13, 1982, Mr. Conger filed an action seeking damages
for personal injuries sustained in the fall against Tel-Tech,
Inc., and others.

The action against Tel-Tech alleged that

Tel-Tech was negligent in its installation of cleaning equipment inside the tanker in that Tel-Tech failed to install walk
protection on the top of the tanker and failed to warn of the
necessity of such walk protection.
B.

Course of Proceedings

On July 23, 1984, Tel-Tech filed a Motion For Summary
Judgment on the grounds that (1) Tel-Tech owed no duty to warn
Meadow Gold, (2) if Tel-Tech owed a duty to warn, that duty was
discharged by Meadow Gold's knowledge of the hazard and (3)
Tel-Tech did not owe Mr. Conger any duty to judge the adequacy
of Meadow Gold's directions.
C.

(R. 185-186, 189-200.)

Disposition Below

On September 20, 1984, Judge Daniels filed a Memorandum
Decision granting Tel-Tech's Motion For Summary Judgment.
Judge Daniels addressed the question of whether one who installs
equipment has a duty to install, or at least recommend, additional safety devices which make the equipment safer to use in
various applications.

(R. 349-353.)
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Judge Daniels concluded

that the "contractor should be allowed to perform the work he
is asked to perform without imposing a duty upon him to investigate the uses to which an owner will put the equipment.

So

long as he performs his work in a workmanlike way and his work
does not cause the equipment to be dangerous, he should not be
held liable if the owner applies the equipment in a dangerous
way.

The duty is upon the owner to use the equipment safely.

If he does not, then he, not the independent contractor, is
responsible."

(R. 349-353.)

On November 6, 1984, Mr. Conger filed a Motion to Amend
and/or for Relief from Judgment Granting Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rules 59(a)(7) and 60(b)(7), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. 371-372.)

In his Motion, Mr.

Conger argued that the case of DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663
P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), which plaintiff had failed previously to
locate in opposing Tel-Tech's Motion for Summary Judgment, was
dispositive on the question of duty in Mr. Conger's favor.
366-370.)

(R.

Tel-Tech opposed Mr. Conger's Motion on several

grounds (R. 376-383), and on November 30, 1984, Judge Daniels
denied Mr. Conger's Motion.

(R. 385-386.)

Mr. Conger voluntarily dismissed his claims against Western
General Dairy, Inc. and settled with Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.
and Scott Wetzel Company.

(Appellant's Brief, p. i.)

The

District Court ordered those claims dismissed on January 12,
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1987 and Mr. Conger filed a Notice of Appeal on February 4,
1987.

(R. 622-626.)

D«

Statement of Facts

1.

On January 1, 1981, while employed by Beatrice Foods

Company, Meadow Gold Division ("Meadow Gold"), appellant Robert
E. Conger ("Mr. Conger") was attempting to clean a stainless
steel milk tank trailer.

He slipped and fell off the top of

the trailer, sustaining serious personal injuries. (R. 156-157.)
2*

Mr. Conger's Second Amended Complaint alleged that

approximately twenty months before Mr. Conger's fall, Tel-Tech
"made certain modifications to said tank trailer, which include
the installation of clean-out valves on the top of the tank,"
and that Tel-Tech "negligently failed to install walk protection to the clean out valves and negligently failed to warn and
advise of the necessity of such walk protection." (R. 156.)
3*

The Meadow Gold Division of Beatrice Foods Co., plain-

tiff's employer, purchased the milk tanker at issue in this case
in March of 1979; two months later, in May of 1979, Tel-Tech
installed the two spray ball stations on the top of the tanker.
(Index 640; deposition of Donald Dvorak, pp. 10-11, 32.)
4. , Tel-Tech is engaged in the business of selling chemicals, stainless steel machinery and certain services to the
dairy industry.

(Index 636; Depo. of Randy Telford, pp. 3-6;

Index 633; Depo. of Leonard Telford, pp. 3-7.) Tel-Tech has the
ability to install spray ball stations on milk tankers. A
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spray ball consists of a piece of stainless steel tubing
inserted through the skin and shell into the tanker itself and
welded into placenot in use.

It is sealed off by a hex nut ferrule when

The station is used as a port through which a

chemical solution and rinsing water are pumped into the tanker
in connection with the cleaning of the tanker's inside.

It

derives its name from the actual device through which the
solution and water flow.

A small spray ball is attached to a

tube, which is connected to the hose accessing the chemical
solution in water.

As the liquids are pumped through the ball,

it sprays them systematically throughout the entire inside of
the tanker.
5.

(Index 633; Depo. of Leonard Telford, pp. 9, 24.)

The milk tanker at issue in this case required two

spray ball stations; without them, it could only be cleaned
manually by a Meadow Gold or Western General employee, who is
required to enter the inside of the tanker and brush on the
chemical solution and rinsing water.

(Index 633; Depo. of

Leonard Telford, pp. 8-9.)
6.

Once the spray ball stations were installed on the

tanker, the operator or other employee responsible for cleaning
the tanker was only required to remove the hex nut ferrule and
connect the tube to a hose.

There were at least three possible

ways of making this connection:

(1) the employee could climb

on top of the tanker using a ladder which is permanently
affixed to the tanker; this, however, would require that he
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walk several feet on the stainless steel crown to the spray
ball station; (2) he could use a portable ladder and station it
immediately under the spray ball station, thereby eliminating
the necessity of walking on the tanker (Index 636; Depo. of
Randy Telford, pp. 22-24; Index 637; Depo. of Robert E. Conger,
p. 107); or (3) a number of dairies including the Western
General facility, have a portable, swinging walkway mounted
above the tanker cleaning bay so that it can be lowered
directly onto the crown near the spray ball station.

(Index

633; Depo. of Leonard Telford, p. 21; Index 638; Depo. of Vern
Thurgood, pp. 13-15, 18, 27, 33-34.)

At the time Tel-Tech

installed the spray ball stations on the Meadow Gold tanker,
Meadow Gold had an arrangement with Western General for the use
of Western General's facilities to clean its tankers; Meadow
Gold paid Western General for this service.

(Index 640; Depo.

of Donald Dvorak, pp. 17-18.)
7.

On May 7, 1979, Tel-Tech installed the two spray ball

stations.

Tel-Tech billed Meadow Gold $170.00 plus tax for the

spray ball stations, which included their installation.

Prior

to their installation, employees at Tel-Tech discussed the
matter with Ronald Dvorak, who is Meadow Gold's local transportation manager.

(Index 640; Depo. of Donald Dvorak, pp. 4, 8,

14, 19.) Mr. Dvorak and the Tel-Tech employees never discussed
anything other than the installation of the spray ball
stations; specifically, Mr. Dvorak never instructed Tel-Tech to
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install walkway protection from the stationary ladder to the
individual spray ball stations.

(Index 640; Depo. of Donald

Dvorak, pp. 19-21.)
8.

Tel-Tech faithfully performed the services which

Meadow Gold requested, i.e., installation of the two spray ball
stations.

No evidence exists in the record that Meadow Gold

ever complained that the work performed by Tel-Tech was defective, or that the spray ball stations did not adequately perform the function for which they were intended: the cleaning
and rinsing of the inside of the tanker.

Meadow Gold accepted

Tel-Tech's services and paid the $178.50 statement in full.
(Index 640; Depo. of Donald Dvorak, Exhibit 2.)
9.

Tel-Tech is not in the business of designing, manufac-

turing or selling safety features on milk tankers.

Tel-Tech is

not in a position to supply materials which could be used as
walkway protection.

Tel-Tech simply does not have the techni-

cal capabilities to design, manufacture and sell safety walkway
protection.

(Index 633; Depo. of Leonard Telford, pp. 20-26,

42; Index 636; Depo. of Randy Telford, pp. 11-12, 21-23.)
Tel-Tech has never held itself out as having knowledge or
experience with respect to safety features on milk tankers.
Tel-Tech has never been asked to install such safety features
and has never been consulted or asked to consult with respect
to such safety features.

(.Id.; Index 638; Depo. of Vern

Thurgood, pp. 36-37.)
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10.

Mr. Donald Dvorak was in charge of the transportation

in Salt Lake City for Beatrice Foods Company, Meadow Gold
Division, at the time Meadow Gold requested that Tel-Tech
install the spray balls.
p.4.)

(Index 640; Depo. of Donald Dvorak,

In his deposition, he testified as follows:

Question: " . . . Do you recall being aware of the
kinds of walk protection that were available for milk
tankers during this period that you were in that job?"
Answer:
"I was familiar with the need for those
things. . . ."

Question: "What I'm getting at is who made the phone
call or whatever to Tel-Tech, and said we'd like you
to do this work?"
Answer: "Well, I made the phone call and asked
Tel-Tech to install the spray ball. . . . "
Question: " . . . Now, did you have any conversation
with Tel-Tech about putting in walk protection from
the ladder or the ports back to the spray ball
assemblies?"
Answer:

"No."

Question: "To your knowledge was any kind of walk
protection ever installed between the spray ball
assemblies and the ports on the top of the trailer?"
Answer:

"I don't know."

Question: "Did you ever give any thought to having
that done?"
Answer:
Question:

"Yes."
"Do you remember when?"

Answer: "Well, at the time of all this. I was
actually gone when this job was completed."
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Question: "Well, what I'm getting at, you said you
had given some thought to putting walk protection on
it. Can you tell me when you had those thoughts?"
Answer:

"I don't recall."

Question: "What did you do about implementing that
thought, if anything?"
Answer:

"I didn't do anything about it."

(Index 640; Depo. of Donald Dvorak, pp. 14, 18-20.)
11.

In his deposition, Mr. Conger testified that he had

driven that particular truck and tanker approximately 500 times
prior to the accident.

He estimated that he had been driving

the tanker some fifteen to sixteen months prior to his accident
and that he had been driving the tanker some six months before
the spray balls were installed.

(Index 637; Depo. of Robert E.

Conger, pp. 41-43, 51.) As part of his duties in driving the
tanker, he was required to clean it out once he was finished
delivering the load.

(Index 637; Depo. of Robert E. Conger,

pp. 51-52.) With respect to walk protection on the tanker in
question, Mr. Conger testified as follows:
Question: "Now you say you talked to other drivers
about the fact that there wasn't any walk protection
on the top of this tanker?"
Answer:

"Yes."

Question:
right?"
Answer:
Question:

"This is before your accident, is that

"Yes."
"Who did you talk to?"
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Answer: "Just general conversations between the
drivers."

Question:

"Why did you think there should have been?"

Answer: "Well, because it's just too slick to stand
up there."
Question: "Before your accident, had you ever been on
top of that tanker when it was too slick to stand in
the area between the hatch and spray ball?"
Answer:

"No."

Question: "How did you know it was too slick to stand
if you had never had that experience personally?"
Answer: "Well, I was putting theory together, you
know, walking on top of stainless steel and the least
little bit of moisture."

Question: "Did you do anything to inform your supervisor or anybody else at Meadow Gold or Beatrice about
your concerns about there being no walk protection up
there?"
Answer:

"Yes, I did."

Question: "Who did you talk to, and what did you do
and when was that?"
Answer: "Well, I mentioned it to Mike Keating and I
mentioned it to Pierce Petersen which was my
supervisor in Orem."

Question: " . . . What was Mr. Keating's position, if
you know?"
Answer:

"He was plant superintendent in Salt Lake."
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Question: "Let's start with Mr. Keating. Do you
remember when you told him about your concern?"
Answer: "Oh it was a couple of months after they put
the balls in."
Question:
him?"

"Do you remember specifically what you told

Answer: "I just asked him if he didn't think that
there should be some walk protection up there."

Question: "Did you ask him about why there wasn't walk
protection there or did you specifically request,
'Hey, put some walk protection up that.'?"
Answer:
"No, I just - I just asked him if he thought
maybe we ought to have some up there."
Question: "What did he say?"
Answer:

"He said, 'I'll look into it.'"

Question: "At the time of this conversation with Mr.
Keating, did Meadow Gold or Beatrice have any kind of
a procedure where if you had a complaint or suggestion
you could write it down, submit it in the form of a
written request?"
Answer: "Yes, they had reports that we turned in
periodically or daily."
Question: "Did you ever include your complaint about
the walk protection on one of these reports?"
Answer:
Question:
Answer:

"Yes."
"When was that?"
"Oh, I couldn't give you a date."

Question: "Would it have been about the same time as
this conversation with Mr. Keating, or before or
after?"
Answer:

"Probably after."
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Question: "How many times did you submit a written
report where you asked or requested something about
the walk protection?"
Answer: MI think it was just a few times for that
particular item.M

Question: "Did Mr. Keating ever get back with you to
tell you he had followed up on your suggestion about
the walk protection?"
Answer:

"No."

Question: "Did you ever go back to him and say, 'Mike
what did you decide about the walk protection* or
words to that effect?"
Answer:

"No."

Question:
Answer:

"Why not?"
"Just didn't do anything about it."

Question: "How about the conversations with Mr.
Petersen concerning the walk protection; do you recall
when that took place, the first one, let's say?"
Answer: "It was probably in the spring because he was
transferred up here in June so it would have to be
after the balls was put in and before he was transferred up here because it was in Orem."
Question:
Answer:

"Spring of 1980?"
"Yes."

Question: "Do you remember what you said to him about
the walk protection?"
Answer: "I just asked him if he could see if we could
get some."
Question:
Answer:
Question:

"What did he say?"
"He said he would look into it."
"Do you know if he ever did?"
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Answer: "I don't know if he ever did or not.
transferred up here."

He was

Question: "Mr. Conger, I asked you several questions
about these reports that you submitted where you wrote
down apparently a suggestion or something about the
walk protection. What specifically did you put in the
report?"
Answer:

"I just said I thought that it needed it."

Question: "When you say it, did you recommend
something specific like grit strips, or catwalks or
what specifically did you recommend?"
Answer:

"Just walk protection."

(Index 637; Depo. of Robert E. Conger, pp. 66-76.)
12.

Prior to the installation of the spray balls on the

tanker in this action, Tel-Tech had consulted in the installation of spray balls on dairy tankers on five or six occasions
but had never done the installation itself.

(Index 633; Depo.

of Leonard Telford, pp. 9-10, 15-17.)
13.

In opposition to Tel-Tech's Motion For Summary Judg-

ment, Mr. Conger submitted the Affidavit of Carl Eilers. Mr.
Eilers set forth his extensive involvement and experience with
liquid food and chemical tankers.

He set forth his experience

with respect to installation of spray balls and explained that
in each case he had recommended some form of walk protection.
He also stated that it was foreseeable that the addition of
spray balls will result in persons walking along the top of the
tanker.

In his view, Tel-Tech should have installed or at
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least recomended to Meadow Gold the installation of walk protection at the time Tel-Tech installed the spray balls.

(R.

234-237.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The District Court correctly held that Tel-Tech owed Mr.
Conger no duty.

The District Court recognized that the exis-

tence of a duty is a question to be determined by the court
based on the facts before it viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.

Where the District Court viewed the facts

before it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in determining the existence or non-existence of a duty, no genuine
issue of material fact exists.
Furthermore, the facts viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff show that Tel-Tech was under no duty to warn
Meadow Gold or Mr. Conger of the hazard of walking on the crown
of a stainless steel tanker trailer that had no walkway protection or of the need for walkway protection.
themselves presented no danger.

The spray balls

Other reasonable means of

access to the spray balls than walking on the crown existed and
Tel-Tech could reasonably assume that Mr. Conger and his
employer would access them in a non-negligent manner.

Addition-

ally, the hazard was open and obvious and it was not necessary
for Tel-Tech to warn of a condition which a mere casual observance would and did disclose.

Tel-Tech was directed simply to
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install two cleaning devices and was not directed to install
walkway protection.

Tel-Tech should not be legally obligated

to judge the adequacies of Meadow Gold's direction.
Finally, even assuming that the District Court erred in
finding that Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger no duty, the error was
harmless.

The alleged duty consists of a duty to warn of the

need for walkway protection when walking on the crown of a
stainless steel tanker trailer.

Both Mr. Conger and his

employer were aware of that need.

Therefore, the duty was

discharged.
ARGUMENT
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT RULED CORRECTLY THAT
TEL-TECH DID NOT OWE MR. CONGER A DUTY.
A.

The Question of the Existence of a Duty was Properly
Resolved by the District Court.
1.

A Negligence Action may not be Maintained when no Duty

or Obligation Existed - A negligence action may be maintained
only if there is a duty or obligation, recognized by law, which
requires the defendant to conform to a particular standard of
conduct in order to protect others against unreasonable risks
of harm.

See, e.g., Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250, 1253

(Utah 1979) (citing W. Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971);
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 (1965)); Gray v. Scott, 565
P.2d 76, 78 (Utah 1977);

Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Bd., 146

Ariz, 352, 706 P.2d 364, 366 (1985).
As Dean Prosser explained, a duty in negligence cases is
defined as an obligation to which the law gives recognition and
effect to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward
another.

W. Prosser & W. Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts

§ 53, 356 (5th ed. 1984).

An actor must bring himself within

the scope of a definite legal obligation so that it is regarded
as personal to him. As Prosser notes, "negligence in the air,
so to speak, will not do." .Id. at 357 (citing Pollock, Law of
Torts 468 (13th ed. 1920) ("negligence does not exist in the
abstract, it contemplates a legal duty owing from one party to
another"); Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376, 379 (10th Cir. 1979)
(Doctor's countersuit alleging that earlier malpractice suit
was frivolous; held that patient's lawyer owed no duty to
doctor)).
2.

The Existence of a Duty is a Question to be Decided as

a Matter of Law - It has long been established that the
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existence of a duty is a question to be decided by the court.4
See, e.g., Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76, 78 (Utah 1977); Hughes
v. Housely, 599 P.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Utah 1979).

This means

that the court must decide:
Whether, upon the facts in evidence, such a relation
exists between the parties that the community will
impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of
the other - or, more simply, whether the interest of
the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled
to a legal protection at the hands of the defendant.
This is entirely a question of law, to be determined
by reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and precedents which makes up the law; it must
be determined only by the court. It is no part of the
province of the jury to decide whether a manufacturer
of goods is under any obligation for the safety of the
ultimate consumer, or whether the Long Island Railroad
is required to protect Mrs. Palsgraf from fireworks
explosions.
W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 37, 206 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis
added).

4

In his brief, Mr. Conger cites the cases of Apache Tank Lines,
Inc. v. Chaney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985) and Williams v. Melby,
699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) for the proposition that negligence
actions ordinarily present questions of fact to be resolved by
the fact finder and that summary judgment in negligence cases
should be granted with great caution. Those cases accurately
state the law but are misapplied in this case. In both cases,
the Court presumed the existence of a legal duty and the
Supreme Court reversed the district courts on the factual
issues of breach of duty, reasonableness of conduct and proximate cause. Neither of those cases addresses the question of
whether a duty in fact arose and neither case stands for the
proposition that the fact finder appropriately decides the
question of duty. Although issues of breach of duty, proximate
cause, foreseeability and reasonableness of conduct ordinarily
present questions of fact to be resolved by the fact finder,
those issues presume the existence of a legal duty. The
question of duty is within the exclusive province of the court.
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As the court in Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Bd., 146 Ariz.
352, 706 P.2d 364, 368 (1985) stated:
The question of duty is decided by the court. The
question is whether the relationship of the party was
such that the defendant was under an obligation to use
some care to avoid or prevent injury to the plaintiff. If the answer is no, the defendant is not
liable even though he may have acted negligently in
light of the foreseeable risks.
Id.

(citing W. Prosser & W. Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on

Torts § 53, at 356-59 (5th ed. 1984); Keckonen v. Robles, 146
Ariz. 268, 705 P.2d 945 (1985)).
3.

No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists on the

Question of Duty - On pages 12-17 of Appellant's Brief, Mr.
Conger asserts that the District Court should have allowed the
question of the existence of a duty to have gone to the jury
because of the facts set forth in Appellant's Brief.5

5

For

In his attempt to show that a fact question exists on the
issue of duty, Mr. Conger cites Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 328B, Comment on Clause (b). Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10.
The example given under Section 328B is the question of what
duty a possessor of land owes to a trespasser. In the area of
landowner liability, the landowner's duty may depend on whether
he was aware of the trespasser. A court viewing that factual
situation in a light most favorable to the plaintiff on a
Motion for Summary Judgment would assume that the trespasser
had been discovered. Based on that view of the facts, then,
the court could proceed to decide whether the possessor owed
the trespasser a duty. In that limited circumstance, a finder
of fact resolves the factual question. However, it is the
court's exclusive province to decide whether a duty exists
based on those facts. As it is shown herein, no such factual
disputes existed. The trial court had the facts before it and
determined that given those facts in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff, Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger no duty.

-18-

purposes of the District Court's determination of whether a
duty existed, the District Court viewed the facts set forth in
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Tel-Tech's Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Mr. Eilers' Affidavit in the light most
favorable to Mr. Conger.

(See R. 349-352.)

Given the plain-

tiff's view of the facts, which Mr. Conger reiterates in his
Brief, the District Court determined that Tel-Tech owed Mr.
Conger no duty.

No dispute existed with respect to those facts

for purposes of the Summary Judgment Motion.

A review of

Appellant's Brief shows that Mr. Conger simply disagrees with
the District Court's determination of no duty and contends that
the facts indeed show that Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger a duty.
Mr. Conger has presented no facts here that were not also
before the District Court.

As will be shown in paragraph B

below, the District Court correctly ruled that Tel-Tech owed
Mr. Conger no duty.
It should be noted at this point that the factual issues
with which Mr. Conger is preoccupied entirely miss the point
and confuse the concept of duty with the concepts of breach,
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foreseeability,6 proximate causation and reasonableness of
conduct.

The case of Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Bd., 146 Ariz.

352, 706 P.2d 364, 367 (1985), explains that those concepts are
separate but are easily confused.

That case involved the ques-

tion of whether the State of Arizona had a duty to take reasonable precaution to avoid injury to invitees in a recreational
area.

The court stated:

We have previously explained that we disapprove of
attempts to equate the concept of duty with specific
details of conduct. Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143
Ariz. 50, 52, 691 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1984). We there
approved Dean Prosser's postulate that it is "better
to reserve 'duty' for the problem of the relation
between individuals which imposes upon one a legal
obligation for the benefit of another . . . M . . .
We again point out that the existence of a duty is not
to be confused with details of the standard of conduct. This incorrectly leads to attempts to decide on
a general basis whether a defendant has a "duty" to
post warning signs, . . . . These details of conduct
bear upon the issue of whether the defendant who does
have a duty has breached the applicable standard of
6

On page 17 of Appellant's Brief, Mr. Conger states that
foreseeability of harm is a question of fact and he cites
several cases which support that proposition, including cases
which state that a person's negligence is not superseded by
another's negligence if the subsequent negligence is foreseeable. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-18. Once again, Appellant
correctly states Utah law but misapplies the law to this case.
Those cases assume the existence of a duty. Where such a duty
exists and a person breaches that duty, his negligence is not
superseded by another's negligence if the subsequent negligence
is foreseeable. However, where the first actor owed no legal
duty, the court never reaches the question of whether a breach
of duty is superseded by another's negligence. Mr. Conger
simply disagrees with the District Court's decision that the
duty was upon Meadow Gold to use the equipment safely and that
Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger no duty.
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care and not whether such a standard of care exists in
the first instance. . . .

The question is whether the relationship of the
parties was such that the defendant was under an obligation to use some care to avoid or prevent injury to
the plaintiff. If the answer is no, the defendant is
not liable even though he may have acted negligently
in light of the foreseeable risks. . . . In the
context of this case, therefore, the concept of duty
is not a question of whether the danger was natural,
artificial, obvious, or whether the defendant should
have searched for, warned of, or removed the danger or
had taken any other particular action. The question
is whether defendant was responsible to take any
precaution for the safety of [plaintiff] or other
invitees. Would the State have been liable even if
the park ranger, knowing of the hazard, had sat on the
rock, watched [plaintiff] get ready to dive and said
nothing? Those who would answer that question in the
negative find no duty. To those who would answer
affirmatively . . . the question is was there a breach
of the duty?
706 P.2d at 367-68 (citations omitted).
Mr. Conger sets forth numerous facts which attempt to equate
the concept of duty with specific details of conduct or a
standard of care that he thinks Tel-Tech was under.
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A careful

review of the facts 7 reveals that those facts do not go to the
question of whether a duty arose but presume the existence of a
duty and go to questions of breach, foreseeability, standard of
care, proximate cause and reasonableness of conduct.

For exam-

ple, Mr. Eilers' Affidavit8 may well attempt to controvert
facts in the record on the question of whether Tel-Tech acted
reasonably, whether it was foreseeable that employees would

7

Mr. Conger contends that fact questions exist with respect to
whether Tel-Tec owed Mr. Conger a duty. As is explained in the
text, those facts, in reality, do not go to the question of
whether Tel-Tec owed Mr. Conger a duty, but rather presumed the
existence of a duty and addressed the subsequent questions of
fact typical of most negligence actions. Those facts are
presented in Mr. Eihlers' Affidavit (R. 234-237), and in
Appellant's Brief at 3-7, with some apparent poetic license.
8

On page 14 of Appellant's Brief, Mr. Conger cites the case of
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) as a case similar
to the one now before the Court wherein the Utah Supreme Court
reversed a summary judgment. Once again, Mr. Conger correctly
states the law but misapplies it in this case. In Williams, an
architect produced an affidavit in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment. The affidavit alleged facts which supported
a conclusion that a third story window in an apartment was
negligently designed, constructed, or maintained and created an
unreasonable risk to occupants' safety. The Court addressed
the question of the adequacy and appropriateness of the
affidavit separately from the question of whether a landlord
owes a tenant a duty. Once the Court concluded that the
landlord owed a duty of reasonable care to the tenant, the
Court concluded that the affidavit presented a sufficient
factual controversy on the question of whether that duty had
been breached. The same reasoning was followed in the case of
Becker v. IRM Corp., 144 Cal. App. 3rd 321, 192 Cal. Rptr. 570
(1983), vacated by 38 Cal. 3d 545, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal Rptr.
213 (1985), also cited by Appellant. The affidavits may well
attempt to create factual disputes on the issues of breach of a
duty and proximate cause, but the affidavits do not and cannot
go to the issue of the existence of a duty.
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walk on top of a tanker truck, whether it was foreseeable that
a person could slip and fall from the top of a tanker trailer
and whether Mr. Eilers warns his customers of what he foresees.

None of those facts puts into controversy the relation

of the parties or the existence of a duty.

Mr. Eilers is not a

legal expert and cannot testify as to the existence or nonexistence of a duty.

Mr. Conger also contends that the jury should

have decided whether a duty existed by showing that Tel-Tech
could have installed a walk protection or could have warned
Meadow Gold of the hazards. Again, those facts presume the
existence of a duty and address the standard of care potentially appropriate if a duty exists.
B.

The District Court Correctly Held that Tel-Tech did

not owe Mr. Conger a Duty.
In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Daniels viewed the facts
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Conger presumes that
the District Court viewed the facts which were before it, which
facts also are before this Court, as though plaintiff's version
of those facts were true.

Taking plaintiff's version of the

facts as true, the District Court found that Tel-Tech owed Mr.
Conger no duty.

Judge Daniels stated as follows:

The issue is one of duty; the question is whether one
who installs or rebuilds equipment has a duty to
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install, or at least recommend additional safety
devices which make the equipment safer to use in
various applications.9
(R. at 350). Judge Daniels found that there were two important
competing policies in balance:

M

[T]he right of the injured

workman to recover, when he really had no control over the
environment in which the truck was to be used; and the right of
a contractor to perform work requested without making further
inquiry as to the specific use, application and environment in
which the object is to be used."

(R. at 351-52.).

On balance,

the District Court followed the majority in Spangler v. Kranco,
Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973).

For the reasons set forth

in the District Court's Memorandum Decision and for additional
reasons set forth herein, the District Court correctly ruled
that Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger no duty.
1.

Tel-Tech was not Obligated to Warn Meadow Gold of

the Necessity of Walkway Protection - Assuming that the lack of
a walkway or walkway protection constituted a dangerous condition, Tel-Tech was not obligated to warn Meadow Gold of the
necessity of their installation.

The Restatement (Second) of

Torts, referenced in Appellant's Brief at 12-13, does not specifically address the issue of whether an independent contractor, such as Tel-Tech, is required to exercise reasonable care

9

Mr. Conger did not controvert the testimony of Tel-Tech
employees in which they stated that Tel-Tech is not in the
business of installing safety features on tanker trailers and
does not have the technical resources to make such installation.
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to inform his employer of a dangerous condition which he is not
employed to repair but discovers in the course of making an
installation, and of which the employer is not aware.

Section

403 of the Restatement states that an independent contractor who
makes, rebuilds, or repairs a chattel for another and turns it
over to another, knowing or having reason to know that his work
has made it dangerous for the use for which it is turned over,
is subject to the same liability as if he supplied the chattel.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 403 (1965).

The liability of a

Supplier of Chattels is set forth in Restatement, Section 388. 10

1

°At page 13 of his Brief, Mr. Conger states that Section 392
of the Restatement sets forth the liability of a supplier of
chattels. A careful review of Section 392 with its comment a
reveals that that section deals solely with the liability of a
supplier of chattels "for another's use . . . [where] the use
is one in which the supplier has a business interest." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 392 and Comment a (1965). Evidence of
such an interest does not exist in the record.
Section 388 states:
Chattel known to be dangerous for intended use. One who
supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the
supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent
of the other or to be endangered by its probable use for
physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied,
if the supplier (a) knows or has reason to know that the
chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for
which it is supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that
those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize
its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of
the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965).
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The $178.50 installation of spray balls was a specialized
service requested of Tel-Tech which did not constitute making,
rebuilding or repairing the milk tanker trailer.

The work

Tel-Tech performed did not, of itself, make the use of the
spray balls dangerous.

As noted by the District Court, the

"use of the spray balls did not make the tanker any more or
less dangerous than it was before.

It was the application of

the truck with its spray balls, i.e., walking on top of the
truck that created the danger."

Additionally, the advisors to

the Restatement expressed "no opinion that a contractor who
fails to exercise reasonable care to inform his employer of a
dangerous condition, which he is not employed to repair, but
which he discovers in the course of making the repairs agreed
upon and of which he realizes that his employer is unaware, may
not be subject to the liability stated in this section."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 403, Caveat (1965).
One of the few cases to address the Caveat under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 403 (1965) is Ayala v. V & O Press
Co., 126 A.2d 229, 512 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1987).

In Ayala, as

opposed to Tel-Tech's installation of spray balls, the defendant's action clearly constituted a repair as set forth in
Section 403 of the Restatement.

There the court addressed the

issue of "whether a party who is retained to perform a specific
repair with respect to a certain machine, and who performs that
repair work without flaw, may be liable for damages upon the
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theory that he negligently failed to warn the owner of the
machine of a design defect inherent in the machine."
N.Y.S.2d at 705.

512

In 1967, the plaintiffs employer requested

defendant to replace various parts missing from a press, including a sweep guard.

Prior to the accident, the guard had been

removed and was nowhere in the area of the press.

The plain-

tiff nonetheless proceeded to use the machine and at one point
the ram descended without warning, resulting in injuries to the
plaintiffs hand.

The evidence showed that the agreement for

the repair was a one-time agreement and did not include routine
or systematic maintenance of the press. The defendant had
performed that service which the plaintiff's employer had
requested.

The parts installed by defendant were not shown to

be defective.

The court acknowledged the Caveat under Restate-

ment (Second) of Torts § 403 where the American Law Institute
expressed no opinion on whether a repairer, who was aware of
the existence of a design defect and of a mechanism which would
have prevented the accident but fails to advise the employer of
the advisability of using such a device, has a duty to use due
diligence in informing the owner of the product of the design
defect and/or the mechanism which would prevent foreseeable
accidents.

The court ruled that such allegations, taken in a

light most favorable to the plaintiff, do not establish a prima
facie case under either a strict products liability or a
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negligence theory.

The court found that the critical factor

which weighed against the imposition of liability for negligence was the absence of any proof that the defendant had
agreed to provide systematic maintenance of the press.

"[A]

single service call would be insufficient to establish the sort
of contact with the product owner needed to trigger a duty to
warn . . . ."

.1(3. at 709.

The court stated:

To hold otherwise would be to expose to liability
every contractor who, over the lifetime of a product,
repairs it in even the slightest way, simply upon the
premise that the contractor ought to have warned of a
dangerous condition inherent in the product's design
for which he was in no way responsible. We do not
choose to expand the scope of products liability to
such an unwarranted degree.
id.
Installation of the spray balls, even if considered a
repair of the tanker, did not change the design of the tanker
and did not necessitate that someone walk on top of the
tanker.

Two reasonable means of access to the spray balls

existed which did not require walking on top of the tanker.

As

Judge Daniels noted, it was only after Meadow Gold and plaintiff accessed the spray balls in an unreasonable manner, which
plaintiff and his employer knew to be unreasonable, that the
tanker became dangerous.

Additionally, the installation of the

spray balls was a one-time event and there is no evidence that
Tel-Tech agreed to provide systematic maintenance of the spray
balls or the tanker.
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The Utah Supreme Court has focused on the duty of a supplier of chattels in a case that is markedly distinguishable
from this case.

In DCR, Inc., v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433

(Utah 1983),ll the Utah Supreme Court sets forth the circumstances under which a supplier of chattels has a duty to warn.
Many of those circumstances are noticeably absent from this
case.

In Peak Alarm, in September of 1976, the owner of a

clothing store contracted with Peak for the installation and
maintenance of a burglar alarm in the clothing store. On
December 22, 1979, a burglary occurred at OCR's store resulting
in an inventory loss of $55,000.00.
to detect the burglary.

Peak's alarm system failed

DCR discovered that the alarm system

had been rendered inoperative prior to the burglary through the
use of a simple deactivating technique well known to criminals.

Peak was aware of the common use of this technique by

11

In Mr. Conger's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend
and/or For Relief from Judgment Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Mr. Conger argued that the Peak Alarm case
compelled the District Court to reverse its prior decision in
which it had granted Tel-Tech's Motion for Summary Judgment.
In Mr. Conger's Motion, he argued that the Peak Alarm case
established a duty of Tel-Tech to warn Meadow Gold of the
danger of walking along the top of a stainless steel tanker
without walkway protection. In Appellant's Brief, however, Mr.
Conger references the Peak Alarm case only once, see,
Appellant's Brief, p. 11, and the reference is simply in
support of the proposition that the existence of a duty may
depend upon proof of the nature of the relationship of the
parties. In the case now before the Court, there is no issue
with respect to the nature of the relationship between the
parties.
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criminals and knew of an easy, inexpensive way to protect its
alarm system against the risk of such deactivation.

In

response to DCR's question as to why Peak had not warned of the
vulnerability of the system and suggested this simple correction, Peak replied that the issuance of such a warning to
customers "would be too time consuming."
The contract which the parties entered into contained a
clause fixing liquidated damages at $50.00.

The trial court in

Peak Alarm granted a motion for summary judgment limiting the
liability of Peak to $50.00 on all causes of action, including
negligence, strict liability and breach of contract.

The Utah

Supreme Court reversed, finding that the contractual limitation
of damages did not apply to a tort duty arising out of the
contract.

The decision, therefore, merely interpreted the

application of a contractual limitation of liability upon a
negligence cause of action.

Id.

at 434.

There are at least five major differences between the
instant case and Peak Alarm which support a finding that
Tel-Tech did not owe Mr. Conger a duty to warn.
First, the duty imposed in Peak Alarm was based upon the
contractual relationships between the parties.

The duty which

the court imposed, to warn of a defect, was to warn of a defect
in the work that Peak Alarm performed.

In the instant case,

there was no defect in Tel-Tech's work and the spray balls
worked flawlessly.
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Second, the duty imposed in Peak Alarm arose out of the
contractual relationship between the plaintiff and defendant.
Id. at 435. The Court stated in Peak Alarm that:
In cases where the alleged negligence consists of a
failure to act, the person injured by another's inaction must demonstrate the existence of some special
relationship between the parties creating a duty on
the part of the latter to exercise such due care in
behalf of the former. Relationships giving rise to
such a duty include those between carriers and passengers, employers and employees, owners and invitees,
and parents and children. Similarly, contractual
relationships for the performance of services imposed
on each of the contracting parties a general duty of
due care toward the other, apart from the specific
obligations expressed in the contract itself. In
other words, where no contractual relationship or
other special relationship exists, no duty arises.
Id. at 435 (emphasis added).

In the instant case, there is no

contractual relationship between Tel-Tech and Mr. Conger.
Third, in the instant case, the installation of the spray
balls did not create any danger to the plaintiff until the milk
tanker was placed in an environment that would allow an
employee of Meadow Gold to walk on top of the milk tanker.

In

Peak Alarm, Peak was the one who installed the burglar alarm
system in DCR's store; consequently, there was no question that
Peak knew of the environment in which the burglar alarm was
placed.
Fourth, the actual duty in Peak Alarm arose out of Peak's
continuing duty under its service and maintenance obligation.
The court stated:
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[Defendant Peak's] duty to warn plaintiff [DCR] of the
vulnerability of its alarm system does not originate
from any promise contained within the service contract
itself. Rather, the duty as it exists in this case is
derived from defendant's general duty of due care
which accompanies its ongoing contractual relationship
with plaintiff for service and maintenance of the
alarm system. Thus, plaintiff's allegation of failure
to warn provides the basis for a cause of action in
tort which is entirely separate from any contractbased which plaintiff might present.
Id. at 436 (emphasis added).

In the instant case, Tel-Tech did

not contract for any such continuing duty.
Fifth, the very purpose for which the contract was entered
in Peak Alarm was to prevent burglaries through an alarm
system.

That purpose was thwarted because of a defect in the

alarm system itself.

In the instant case, the purpose of the

contract was to install spray balls so that the inside of the
milk tanker could be cleaned.

If Tel-Tech had contracted to

install walkway protection (which it does not have the technical means to do), and Mr. Conger had fallen despite the
existence of the walkway protection because of a defect known
to the installer which could have been easily remedied, the
cases may be sufficiently similar to impose a duty.
2.

Tel-Tech had no Duty to Warn Meadow Gold or Mr. Conger

of an Open and Obvious Hazard - From a practical, policy and
legal standpoint, Mr. Conger's contention -- that Tel-Tech
should have warned Meadow Gold that people who walk on top of
stainless steel milk tanker trailers that have no walkway
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protection while cleaning them run the risk of slipping and
falling —

is unpersuasive.

The law should not encourage

people to take leave of their common sense or to take risks
wittingly.

A majority of jurisdictions agree with this

rationale in holding that a supplier of a chattel has no duty
to warn where a certain use of the chattel creates an obvious
risk to the user.

For example, in the case of Posey v. Clark

Equip. Co,; 409 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 940
(1969), the operator of a forklift was injured when he was
struck by a falling carton.

He alleged that the manufacturer

of the forklift was liable under the doctrine of strict
liability for failure to warn the operator of a forklift of the
possibility of danger from falling objects where the forklift
had no guard protection.

Citing Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 402(A), comments i and j, the Posey court stated:
"But a seller is not required to warn . . . when the
danger or the potentiality of danger is generally
known and recognized." "The article sold must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics."
Sec. 388 of the Restatement is also instructive with
respect to the duty of a supplier of a chattel to warn
users where he knows or has reason to know that the
chattel is dangerous. One element of liability is
that he "has no reason to believe that those for whose
use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous
condition."
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Comment k on that element says, in part, "However, the
condition, although readily observable, may be one
which only persons of special experience would realize
to be dangerous. In such case, if the supplier, having such special experience, knows that the condition
involves danger and has no reason to believe that
those who use it will have such special experience as
will enable them to perceive the danger, he is required
to inform them of the risk of which he himself knows,
and which he has no reason to suppose that they will
realize."
409 F.2d at 563.

The court found as a matter of law that the

defendant had no duty to warn because it was "not a situation
where only persons of . . . special experience would realize
the danger which might befall an unprotected operator when
working in proximity to high stacks of cartons."

Id. at 564.

See also Ragsdale v. K-Mart Corp., 468 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. App.
1984) (no duty to warn against putting hands against rotating
lawn mower blade where danger of rotating blade was open and
obvious); Stodghill v. Fiat-Allis Constr. Machinery, Inc., 163
Ga. App. 811, 295 S.E.2d 183 (1982) (no duty to warn of dangers
associated with hazards involving the lack of a protective
metal cage surrounding bulldozer driver's seat where the
machine was without latent defects, its functioning created no
danger or peril unknown to the user and lack of protective cage
was an obvious characteristic of the machine that created no
hidden peril and did not prevent the machine from functioning
properly for the purpose for which it was designed); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, Comment K to Clause (b) (1965)
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("It is not necessary for the supplier to inform those for
whose use the chattel is supplied of a condition which a mere
casual looking over will disclose") (further discussed infra.,
Footnote 13.)
Assuming that Tel-Tech, the installer of the $178.50
cleaning devices is extrapolated to become the supplier of the
tanker/trailer, Tel-Tech still was under no duty to warn where
the hazard was open and obvious because the danger associated
with walking on the crown of a stainless steel tanker while
cleaning it was within the ordinary knowledge and common sense
of those who would use the tanker, and a mere casual looking
over disclosed the condition of which Appellant claims he
should have been warned.
3.

Tel-Tech did not owe Mr. Conger any Duty to Judge the

Adequacies of Meadow Gold's Direction - Tel-Tech installed the
spray balls in accordance with Meadow Gold's directions.
Tel-Tech was not asked to install any walk protection or walkways, nor was Tel-Tech informed of how Meadow Gold intended to
obtain access to the spray ball stations.

Tel-Tech, therefore,

was not under any duty to Mr. Conger to insure that Meadow Gold
would obtain access to the spray ball installations in a nonnegligent manner.

The instant case is similar to Paul Mueller

Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982).
In that case, the owner contracted with Maxum, the general
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contractor, for the installation of a whey drying system on the
owner's premises.

The general contractor subcontracted with

Mueller to construct four large drying cylinders, a drying chamber and other parts of the system and with Dahle to assemble
and install the system.

The owner of the building in which the

whey drying system was installed sued Mueller and Dahle for
negligence claiming that they owed a duty to guard the owner
against economic losses attributable to defects in the product.
The Utah Supreme Court rejected this contention stating as
follows:
Assuming, arguendo, that the W.R.H. case established a
duty of reasonable care on the part of a manufacturer
to guard against economic loss to users of its product,
such a duty would not apply to appellants [Mueller and
Dahle] in the present case. Appellants are not "manufacturers" comparable to the manufacturer in the
W.R.H. case. While the latter manufactured products
destined for retail sale to unknown and potentially
inexperienced purchasers, appellants provided their
products and services to a presumably knowledgeable
contractor in accordance with detailed contract
specifications. Appellants in no way concealed the
alleged defects in the drying chamber from Maxum and
were in no better position to anticipate possible
economic consequences of such defects than was Maxum
itself. Having contracted directly with Maxum and
knowing of Maxum's close supervision of the entire
installation process, appellants had reason to expect
that Maxum would protect respondent's interest by
observing and obtaining correction of obvious
defects. The trial court correctly found that Maxum
bore responsibility for correction of such defects.
Id. at 1286 (emphasis added).
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Tel-Tech was in a position similar to that of the subcontractors, Mueller and Dahle, in the Mueller case.

Tel-Tech

installed the spray ball station in accordance with its
contract with Meadow Gold and with Meadow Gold's request.
Unlike the Mueller case, however, there were no defects in
Tel-Tech's work.

Tel-Tech reasonably expected Meadow Gold to

protect the interests of its employees by observing and
correcting any deficiencies in the design of the milk tanker
created by Meadow Gold's choice of the one of three obvious
ways to obtain access to the spray ball station, i.e., to
install a walkway if Meadow Gold was going to have its
employees walk on the milk tanker crown rather than utilizing
either a separate ladder, or as Western Dairy did, a movable
platform.

(Index 633; Depo. of Leonard Telford, p. 20; see

Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. Waukesha Bearings Corp., 502 F.
Supp 1163, 1174-75 (E.D. La. 1980).

Tel-Tech in no way

concealed alleged defects and was in no better position to
anticipate possible or alleged defects than were Meadow Gold
and Mr. Conger.
The rule that an independent contractor who follows the
owner's directions in making repairs or alterations of a
chattel is not liable for defects in the owner-furnished plans,
specifications or directions, finds further support in
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 404, Comment a (1965), which
states in part:
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[0]ne who employs a contractor to make a chattel for
him, like one who employs a contractor to erect a
structure on his premises, (as to which see § 385),
usually provides not only plans, but also specifications which often state the material which must be
used. Indeed, chattels are often made by independent
contractors from materials furnished by their employers. In such a case, the contractor is not required
to sit in judgment on the plans and specifications or
the materials provided by this employer. The contractor is not subject to liability if the specified
design or material turns out to be insufficient to
make the chattel safe for use, unless it is so
obviously bad that a competent contractor would realize that there was a grave chance that his product
would be dangerously unsafe.
(Emphasis added).

A majority of jurisdictions, including Utah,

follow this rule.

See, e.g. Benson v. Ames, 604 P.2d 927, 929

(Utah 1979); Leninger v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co., 17
Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33 (1965); Moon v. Winger Boss Co., 205
Neb. 292, 287 N.W.2d 430, 433 (1980); Spangler v. Kranco Inc.,
481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973); Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Co.,
221 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Ind. 1963).

The court in Spangler v.

Kranco Inc., stated:
There was no defect in the crane itself. . . . True,
there were no bell or warning devices, but the reasonable need for such equipment depended upon the environment in which it was used by Reynolds . . .
481 F.2d at 375; see also Marshall v. H. K. Ferguson Co., 623
F.2d 882, 885 (4th Cir. 1980) ("the evidence showed that the
machine operated precisely as it was designed to do.
[Plaintiff's] unfortunate injury was not caused by any defect
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inherent in the design or construction of the [machine], but
resulted from the procedure followed by the employees").
Likewise, in the instant case, whether walkway protection
or walkways were needed depended upon the environment in which
Meadow Gold utilized the milk tanker.

There were two other

alternatives available to Meadow Gold which would not have
required anyone to walk on the crown of the milk tanker: a
separate ladder or a swinging platform walkway.
The alleged negligent defect is in Tel-Tech's failure to
install walkways or walkway protection (of which Tel-Tech was
not capable and which fact Mr. Conger has not controverted with
competent evidence).

Tel-Tech is not liable to Mr. Conger

because Tel-Tech installed the spray balls in accordance with
Meadow Gold's directions, which did not include any direction
to install walkway protection or walkways.
As Judge Daniels stated in his Memorandum Decision:
This case is similar to, but not precisely identical
with those cases where an independent contractor performs work in compliance with the owner's plans and
specifications. These cases uniformly hold that there
is no liability, unless the plans are so defective
that they would not be followed by a reasonable
person. In this case, however, there were no formal
plans, or specifications. . . .
I believe that the case cited which is most nearly on
point is Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th
Cir. 1973). In that case, Kranco had installed a
crane properly, but had not installed a bell or warning device. The court held that there was no duty to
do so, because the need for the device depended upon
the environment in which the crane was to be used.
Similarly, whether a walkway was needed on the milk
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truck depended upon what equipment Meadow Gold had,
and what its work rules were.
The converse view is expressed by Judge Butzner in the
dissent in the Spangler case. I do not believe that
any of the Utah cases provide guidance as to which
approach should be followed. There are two important
competing policies in balance: the right of the
injured workman to recover, when he really had no control over the environment in which the truck was to be
used; and the right of a contractor to perform work
requested without making further inquiry as to the
specific use, application and environment in which the
object is to be used. I believe that on balance the
view of the majority in Spangler is correct. A contractor should be allowed to perform the work he is
asked to perform without imposing a duty upon him to
investigate the uses as to which the owner will put
the equipment. So long as he performs his work in a
workmanlike way, and his work does not the cause the
equipment to be dangerous, he should not be held liable if the owner applies the equipment in a dangerous
way. The duty is upon the owner to use the equipment
safely.
(R. 350-52.)
Judge Daniels* balancing of the competing policies in this
case and resolution in favor of Tel-Tech are consistent with
the rationale of the Mueller case cited above.
POINT II
IF THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
TEL-TECH OWED MR. CONGER NO DUTY, IT WAS
HARMLESS ERROR.
A.

Summary Judgment is Appropriate on Questions of Breach

where no Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist.
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that summary judgment
is appropriate where the pleadings and other submissions,
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including depositions, show that no genuine issue as to any
material fact exists.

Even where a fact remains in dispute,

that fact must be material and must be genuinely controverted.
See, e.g., Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah
1980); see also Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983)
("Although the facts and the inferences from the facts properly
before the court are to be construed in favor of the opponent
on a motion of summary judgment, the mere existence of issues
of fact does not preclude summary judgment.

The issues of fact

must be material to the applicable rule of law") (citing Horgan
v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 1982)).
Although the Utah Supreme Court has cautioned that summary
judgment should be carefully scrutinized in negligence cases
where the facts are disputed, the facts material to the
applicable rule of law in this case are not in dispute.
B.

Assuming that Tel-Tech was under an Obligation to warn

Meadow Gold, the Obligation was Discharged by Meadow Gold's and
Mr. Conger's Knowledge of the Hazard - Even assuming that
Tel-Tech was under an obligation to warn Meadow Gold, the obligation can be discharged by notice to Meadow Gold.

Wissman v.

General Tire Co. of Philadelphia, 327 Pa. 215, 192 A. 633
(1932).

The notice is not necessary, and the obligation is

discharged, if the employer is aware of the defect.

It is not

necessary for the independent contractor to inform his employer
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of something of which he is already aware.

Long v. Deere &

Co., 238 Kan. 766, 715 P.2d 1023, 1029 (1986); Goodbar v.
Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Va. 1984), aff'd sub.
nom., Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985); E. L.
Shorafa v. Ruprecht, 345 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977);
Slavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2nd 462 (Fla. 1959).

In Long, the court

set forth Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which is the general rule regarding a Supplier's duty to
warn.12

Referring to Section 388 the Long court stated:

As with most rules, the above rule requiring a manufacturer to warn is not without exception. One such
exception was recognized in Jones v. Hittle Service,
Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383, where the court
stated: "there is no duty to warn of dangers actually
known to the user of a product, regardless of whether
the duty rests in negligence or on strict liability."
219 Kan. 639-40, quoting Garrett v. Nissen Corp., 84
N.M. 16, 21, 498 P.2d 1359 (1972). (Emphasis added.)
Long, 715 P.2d at 1029. The Long court further stated:
It would seem to be an obvious truism to state that
there is no duty on the part of a manufacturer or
seller to give a warning of a product-connected danger
where the person who claims to be entitled to the
warning actually knows of the danger. The case law
also clearly supports the view that a person is not
entitled to be warned about something he already
knows. Similarly, there is no duty to warn employees
of the purchaser of a product, where it appears that
such employees knew of the dangers to which the
warning would have related.
Id. (quoting Annot., 76 A.L.R. 2d 9 (1961) (emphasis added)).

12

See Footnote 10, supra.
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At the time Tel-Tech installed the spray ball stations,
Donald Dvorak was Meadow Gold's transportation manager and was
responsible for transportation safety.

(Index 640; Depo. of

Donald Dvorak, pp. 4, 8, 14, 19). At that time, Mr. Dvorak
considered the installation of a walkway on the milk tanker but
failed to do anything about it.

(Index 640; Depo. of Donald

Dvorak, p. 20). As noted above, if the owner is aware of the
defect in a contractor's work and does nothing to correct it,
the contractor is not liable to a third party injured by the
defect.

Consequently, because Mr. Dvorak knew of the potential

safety hazard, and failed to do anything about it, any duty
owed Meadow Gold or Mr. Conger by Tel-Tech was discharged by
the knowledge.
Additionally, Mr. Conger's own testimony states that he was
aware of the hazard, had discussed it with co-employees and had
asked two of his supervisors about the possibility of installing walkway protection on the tanker.
Robert E. Conger, pp. 66-76).

(Index 637; Depo. of

As noted above, "there is no

duty to warn employees of the purchaser of a product, where it
appears that such employees knew of the danger to which the
warning would have related."

Mr. Conger argues that based on

Section 403, Restatement (Second) of Torts, the maker,
rebuilder or repairer of a chattel who knows or has reason to
know that his work has made the chattel dangerous for the use
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for which it is turned over is subject to the same liability as
if he supplied the chattel.

Mr. Conger then contends that the

duty applicable to suppliers of chattels attaches.13

However,

the obvious truism is that where both Meadow Gold (Donald
Dvorak, Mr. Petersen and Mr. Keating) and Mr. Conger himself
actually knew of the danger but failed to anything about it,
any duty to warn of the danger was discharged.

13

See Footnote 10, supra. Comment k to Clause (b) to Section
388, the duty applicable to suppliers of chattels, states:
When warning of defects unnecessary. One who supplies a
chattel to others to use for any purpose is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous
character insofar as it is known to him, or of facts which,
to his knowledge, make is likely to be dangerous, if but
only if, he has no reason to expect that those for whose
use the chattel is supplied will discover its condition and
realize the danger involved. It is not necessary for the
supplier to inform those for whose use the chattel is
supplied of a condition which a mere casual looking over
will disclose, unless the circumstances under which the
chattel is supplied are such as to make it likely that even
so casual an inspection will not be made.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, Comment k to Clause (b)
(1965). In other words, no duty to warn exists where the
supplier had reason to expect that the users of the chattel
would discover its condition and realize the danger involved
from a casual inspection of the chattel. The facts show that
not only did Tel-Tech have reason to expect that the users of
the chattel would discover its condition and realize the danger
involved, Meadow Gold and Mr. Conger himself did discover its
condition and realized the danger involved in walking along the
top of the milk tanker without walkway protection.
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CONCLUSION
The facts of this case show that Meadow Gold asked Tel-Tech
to make a relatively inexpensive installation of cleaning equipment on the tanker trailer.

Meadow Gold and Mr. Conger knew of

how the spray ball station would be accessed and knew of the
danger in selecting that alternative.

Yet, in the face of

those known dangers, Meadow Gold and Mr. Conger continued.

To

impose a duty on Tel-Tech where Meadow Gold had requested only
the installation of spray balls, knew of the dangers and yet
selected the most unreasonable means to access

the spray balls

would impose absolute liability on Tel-Tech.

Such an unreason-

able request should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this

/^Af) day of August, 1987.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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